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The principal-agent problem and uncertainty are some of the key factors affecting 
ﬁ  nancial and political markets. Fear of the unknown plays an important role in 
human decision making, including voting. This article describes a theoretical mo-
del where voter risk aversion towards uncertainty gives political incumbents a 
signiﬁ  cant advantage over their challengers, exacerbating the principal-agent 
problem between voters and legislators. The model presented predicts that a rise 
in voter uncertainty concerning the challenger allows the incumbent to deviate 
from the median voter’s policy preference without losing the election. This model 
reconciles the paradoxical coexistence of ideological shirking and high incum-
bent reelection rates without abandoning the elegant median voter framework.
Keywords: ideology, incumbency advantage, shirking, median voter, risk aver-
sion, principal-agent problem
1 INTRODUCTION
The high reelection rates enjoyed by political incumbents suggest that either they do 
a superb job of representing voters’ interests or that they command a signiﬁ  cant in-
cumbency advantage over challengers. Each view has its supporters and critics. In 
this article, I focus on the documented prevalence of the incumbency advantage or 
monopoly power in the electoral systems (Garand and Gross, 1984; Collie, 1981; 
Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina, 1988; Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Katz, 
1996). This advantage has been linked to lower electoral responsiveness (Coyne and 
Fund, 1992; Rivers and Brady, 1991), weaker political competition (Levitt and Wol-
fram, 1996), greater pork-barrel spending (Fiorina, 1989), better knowledge of the 
electorate (Neuman, 1986), ﬁ  scal illusion and “love for stability” (Mourao, 2008 and 
2010), and ideological shirking (Yakovlev, 2007). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the incumbency advantage is often viewed as a threat to public sector efﬁ  ciency.
Despite numerous empirical studies documenting the inefﬁ  ciencies of the electo-
ral systems, very few theoretical papers examine how inefﬁ  ciencies may arise in 
a competitive median voter framework. This article attempts to ﬁ  ll this void by 
developing a model that explains how voter risk aversion towards uncertainty 
translates into incumbency advantage and enables incumbents to legislate farther 
away from their constituents’ interests or to pursue ideological shirking. The mo-
del is based on Black’s (1948) median voter framework and entails solving a com-
putationally intensive, sequential Stackelberg game. The model shows that higher 
incumbency advantage, in terms of higher vote shares, enables incumbents to sa-
criﬁ  ce some of their votes in exchange for ideological shirking and still get ree-
lected. This conclusion is consistent with the empirical evidence on politicians 
deviating from the median voter without being voted out of ofﬁ  ce.1 The theoretical 
1 See Berger et al. (2000) for theoretical arguments as to why the Downsian model can predict divergence. 
See Kau and Rubin (1979), Kalt and Zupan (1984), Medoff et al. (1995), Parker and Powers (2002), Yakovlev 




































































































































467 model developed in this article reconciles the paradoxical coexistence of ideolo-
gical shirking and high incumbent reelection rates in the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, for example, as documented by Yakovlev (2007).
2 VOTER RISK AVERSION AND IDEOLOGICAL SHIRKING
The incumbency advantage is the often-cited reason as to why incumbents seem 
to win the vast majority of elections. Voter risk aversion towards uncertainty could 
be one of the major sources of the incumbency advantage (Berger et al., 2000). As 
implied by the popular idiomatic expression “Better the devil you know than the 
devil you don’t”, a well-known but imperfect incumbent might be preferred by the 
voters to a relatively unknown but well-qualiﬁ  ed challenger. This uncertainty-dri-
ven advantage enables incumbents to behave in a way that is inconsistent with 
their voters’ preferences and still get reelected. In other words, this asymmetric 
uncertainty allows incumbents to shirk, exacerbating the principal-agent problem 
in the political market where voters are the principal and incumbents are their 
agents. There are two not mutually exclusive types of shirking: ideological and 
non-ideological.2 This article focuses on the former. Ideological shirking pertains 
to misrepresenting constituents’ preferences. For example, Washington (2008) 
ﬁ  nds that the proportion of daughters signiﬁ  cantly affects a male legislator’s pro-
pensity to vote liberally on reproductive rights despite his constituents’ ideology. 
Non-ideological shirking pertains to actions that avoid work or duties such as 
absenteeism, corruption, and so forth. 
The idea that politicians are not simply vote-maximizing agents is not new. For 
instance, Sobel (1992) models politicians as rational utility-maximizing agents 
who may pursue other interests even if it may cost them reelection. Sobel conclu-
des that incumbents ﬁ  nd it optimal to give up some surplus votes (votes in excess 
of what is needed for reelection) in exchange for pursuing other objectives such as 
logrolling, special-interest legislation, or legislation closer to their own ideology. 
This idea is consistent with the theorem of minimal winning coalitions, which 
postulates that a political coalition will be as small as possible as long as it is win-
ning or can dictate a decisive outcome (Riker, 1962).3 It is also possible that some 
incumbents may ﬁ  nd it optimal to shirk to the full extent even if it puts them out 
of ofﬁ  ce.4 However, since the incumbent reelection rate in the U.S. Congress and 
Senate elections typically exceeds 70 percent (Benjamin and Malbin, 1992; Davi-
dson and Oleszek, 1994; and Miller, 1999), it must be the case that most of the 
incumbents remaining in ofﬁ  ce do not have an insatiable appetite for shirking. 
Therefore, the model developed in this article describes the behavior of a typical 
2 See Bender and Lott (1996) for a thorough and critical review of the shirking literature.
3 The formation of a minimal winning coalition here does not depend on the transaction costs between the 
members of the “selectorate” and the coalition since their decisions are independent of each other and are based 
only on their single-peaked preferences for the platforms proposed by the competing candidates.
4 A study by Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) finds that the incumbent expecting to lose the election is willing 
to pay more for the public project than its total value to the voters, suggesting that incumbents shirk more in 




































































































































468 incumbent, who ﬁ  nds it optimal to do some shirking as long as it does not put him 
or her out of ofﬁ  ce. 
3 THE MODEL
This article’s theoretical model builds on the seminal work by Hotelling (1929), 
Black (1948), and Downs (1957). Hotelling’s (1929) competition or “linear city” 
model, known for its principle of minimum differentiation, can be thought of as a 
precursor to the median voter model. In Hotelling’s linear city model, two compe-
ting businesses locate next to each other in the middle of a one-dimensional market 
space in order to maximize their market shares. Hotelling’s principle of minimum 
differentiation extends naturally to a “political market” where two competing po-
liticians propose the exact same policy most preferred by the median voter. The 
median voter theorem was ﬁ  rst articulated in Duncan Black’s 1948 article, “On 
the Rationale of Group Decision-making” and popularized in Anthony Downs’s 
1957 book, An Economic Theory of Democracy. I combine the median voter fra-
mework with voter risk-aversion speciﬁ  cation borrowed from Chen and Niou 
(2007), who attempt to reconcile high incumbent reelection rates with legislative 
term limits.
As typical of the median voter models, I assume a one-dimensional policy space 
[0, 1] on which political candidates propose their platforms. Let voters’ preferen-
ces over policies be single-peaked and characterized by quadratic utility function 
ux (y) = – (y – x)2, where x is the voter x’s most-preferred policy and y is the ac-
tually policy implemented. Let some voter x be identiﬁ  ed by his most preferred 
policy value x that is uniformly distributed on a one-dimensional policy space
[0, 1]. Let the incumbent be the left-wing candidate and the challenger be the ri-
ght-wing candidate, stated mathematically as  1
2
1
0 < < < < PC PI x x , where xPI and xPC 
correspond to their respective historical policy platforms or their party’s platforms.
The next step is to specify how uncertainty about political candidates enters a 
voter’s utility function. Suppose that the incumbent and the challenger are asso-
ciated with different uncertainty levels in the eyes of the voters. Voters may form 
a relatively good impression of the incumbent’s policy platform based on the ob-
served performance in ofﬁ  ce, decreasing the uncertainty associated with the in-
cumbent. The same cannot be said about the untested challenger, who might ap-
pear as a wildcard candidate. Therefore, the incumbent and the challenger will 
differ in their abilities to propose credible platforms in an election, giving rise to 
the incumbency advantage. When the challenger proposes some platform xC, the 
voters form an expectation of that platform due to the uncertainty associated with 
whether or not the promised platform will be implemented. Like Berger et al. 
(2000), and Chen and Niou (2007), I assume that voters form an expectation of the 
challenger’s platform that can be represented by the random variable  m xC with den-










































































































































where m(xC ) is the mean of the random variable  m xC with variance V(xC). 
Like Bernhard and Ingberman (1985), I assume that m(xC ) = xC, which states that 
the mean of  m xC equals the proposed platform. Subsequently, V (xC ) is the extent of 
uncertainty with which voters perceive the candidate’s real position. Thus, voter 
utility is a function of uncertainty regarding the challenger’s true position V (xC ) 
and the distance between the voter’s and the candidate’s expected positions
(xC – x)2. Voter utility decreases in both V (xC ) and (xC – x). Like Chen and Niou 
(2007), I decompose V (xC ) into vC and kC (xC – xPC )2, where vC is voter disutility 
from the intrinsic uncertainty that is associated with the challenger and
kC (xC – xPC )2 is voter disutility from the extrinsic uncertainty caused by the chal-
lenger’s strategic positioning. Intrinsic uncertainty represents voter’s risk pre-
mium for being indifferent between accepting a deﬁ  nite position xC and accepting 
a random position  m xC with the mean value xC. Extrinsic uncertainty represents 
voter skepticism towards the platform proposed by the challenger. The farther xC 
deviates from xPC, the greater the voter disutility. Voter skepticism increases in kC, 
which represents the degree of voter aversion to extrinsic uncertainty. The more 
the challenger deviates from his historical or party platform xPC, the greater the 
uncertainty with which he will be perceived by the voters. Voter risk aversion 
towards uncertainty limits the challenger’s ability to propose a vote-maximizing 
platform by making the voters skeptical of that platform. Voter utility for the chal-
lenger is then:
 u x(xC ) = –vC – kC (xC – xPC )2 – (xC – x)2. (2)
Analogously, voter utility for the incumbent can also be described as a function of 
uncertainty V (x1 ) regarding the incumbent’s true position and the distance between 
the voter’s and the candidate’s expected positions (x1 – x)2. As with the challenger, 
V (x1 ) can be decomposed into intrinsic uncertainty v1 and extrinsic uncertainty
kI (xPI – xI)2, where k1 is the degree of voter aversion towards extrinsic uncertainty. 
For obvious reasons, voters may experience some intrinsic uncertainty with the 
incumbent, but probably less than with the challenger (vI < vC). Additionally, voters 
dislike the deviation of the incumbent’s legislative platform x1 from the promised 
platform xPI because it represents ideological shirking or voter betrayal and, as 
such, can be modeled as extrinsic uncertainty. Additionally, rationally ignorant vo-
ters may not know the exact positioning of the incumbent’s policy platform, but 
may form a pretty accurate expectation of it on average (i.e. let the mean of random 
variable  m xI equal xI). Hence, voter utility for the incumbent can be described as:
 u x(x1 ) = – vI – kI (xPI – xI )2 – (xI – x)2. (3)
The incumbency advantage stems from a lower amount of intrinsic uncertainty for 
the incumbent than for the challenger (vI < vC). This asymmetrically-distributed 




































































































































470 tion because voters dislike uncertainty. Ideological shirking, deﬁ  ned as sI = xPI – xI, 
can be negative (sI < 0) or positive (sI > 0). That is, a left-wing incumbent in this 
model can legislate to the right or to the left of xPI on the [0, 1] policy space. By 
changing the deﬁ  nition of xPI, one can change which platform the incumbent is 
shirking from: the incumbents’ party platform, the core constituents’ platform, the 
platform espoused in the primaries, or the median voter platform. In this article, I 
assume that the incumbent ran and was elected on the platform most preferred by 
the median voter (xPI = 0.5). Therefore, ideological shirking represents deviation 
from the median voter platform. Since the median voter platform may not be efﬁ  -
cient, it is possible that ideological shirking could be socially optimal in some si-
tuations.
Continuing with the model, let  ˉ x be the position of the voter who is indifferent to 
both incumbent and challenger. Replacing x with  ˉ x and setting the two utility 
functions equal to each other yields:
 –  vI – kI (xPI – xI)2 – (xI – ˉ x)2 = – vC – kC (xC – xPC)2 – (xC – ˉ x)2.  (4)
Solving equation (4) for  ˉ x yields:
 
.  (5)
The share of votes obtained by the incumbent (the left-wing candidate) is determi-










The electoral competition between the incumbent and the challenger can be mo-
deled as a strategic, sequential Stackelberg game in which the incumbent moves 
ﬁ  rst and the challenger responds. In this static game, the incumbent legislates 
strategically to ensure his reelection for another term, after which he retires. Thus, 
the incumbent runs for reelection only once, but consumes the ego-rents from 
holding ofﬁ  ce and shirking in both terms. The amount of shirking is constrained 
by the reelection incentive only in the ﬁ  rst term and is the focus of this model. 
The Stackelberg game is solved by backward induction because the incumbent 
anticipates (endogenizes) the challenger’s response. First, I solve for the challen-
ger’s platform x*
C





































































































































471 The incumbent takes the challenger’s optimal policy platform xC
* into account in 
his optimal policy platform xI
*. To ﬁ  nd xI
*, I substitute the challenger’s optimal 
platform x*
C
  for xC in equation (5), set the expression for ˉ x in equation (5) equal to 
0.5+ε, ε being the tie-breaker or decisive vote percentage, and solve for xI .5 Assu-
ming that all other parameters in the model are exogenous, the incumbent’s opti-
mal policy platform is:






The solution in equation (9) ensures that the incumbent obtains the maximum 
amount of ideological shirking (sI = xPI – xI
*) and still receives his ego-rents from 
holding ofﬁ  ce (i.e. reelection occurs with exactly ˉ x = 0.5 + ε votes). A left-wing 
incumbent must be legislating or shirking to the left of xPI on the [0, 1] policy 
space if sI > 0, and to the right of xPI if sI < 0.6
Recall this article’s hypothesis that greater relative uncertainty (vC > vI ) associated 
with the challenger increases the incumbency advantage, which is the amount of 
votes he can trade for shirking sI without losing ofﬁ  ce. Equation (9) ensures that 
all votes in excess of  ˉ x = 0.5 + ε are turned into shirking. The partial derivatives 
of sI with respect to vI , vC, and other variables would be useful in examining the 
model’s predictions, but because these equations are too cumbersome, the nume-
rical solutions presented in the next section will be used to determine the signs of 
these derivatives. 
4 NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS
The numerical solutions presented in this section are based on the model’s para-
meters held constant at xPI = 0.5, xPC = 0.6, vC = vI = 0.01, kI = kC = 1, and ε = 0.01, 
while varying one of them at a time to determine their partial effects on shi-
rking.7 
The numerical solutions shown in ﬁ  gure 1 indicate that ideological shirking sI is 
negatively related to the intrinsic uncertainty associated with the incumbent
(dsI / dvI < 0) and positively related to the intrinsic uncertainty associated with the 
challenger (dsI / dvC > 0). The graphed solutions also reveal that shirking decreases 
5 As discussed in the previous section, the incumbent maximizes votes only up to 0.5+ε because the additional 
votes beyond that amount do not contribute anything to victory or to the ego-rents from holding office, but 
do decrease shirking. In reality, a political candidate may not be able exercise this level of precision and may 
seek additional or surplus votes as a buffer, which can also be captured by ε.
6 The model can be generalized to include situations where the two candidates compete on the same side of 
the policy space, but the left-wing and right-wing characterization of political candidates is more intuiti  vely 
appealing and realistic.
7 These parameters imply that the incumbent’s promised platform is centered on the median voter, the 
challenger’s party platform is slightly to the right of the median voter, both candidates are equal in intrinsic 




































































































































472 more rapidly in vI than it increases in vC, holding the other constant. The practical 
implication of these results is that incumbents can attain a higher level of votes 
(and shirking) by making the challengers look relatively more unreliable, wave-
ring, or untrustworthy. This posits one possible explanation for the Republican 
opponents of the 2004 Democratic nominee, John Kerry, labeling him as a “ﬂ  ip-
ﬂ  opper.” Doing so may have been an attempt, by the Republicans, to increase the 
intrinsic uncertainty associated with this Democratic challenger.
 
FIGURE 1
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The numerical solutions shown in ﬁ  gure 2 indicate that ideological shirking is 
positively related to the extrinsic uncertainty associated with the challenger 
(dsI / dkC > 0) and negatively related to the extrinsic uncertainty associated with 
the incumbent (dsI / dkI < 0). The practical implication of these results is that in-
cumbents’ shirking will increase with greater voter aversion (kC) towards challen-
gers who appear as ideologically extreme. This may explain why politicians often 
claim that their opponents are far outside the mainstream.
FIGURE 2
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473 The numerical solutions shown in ﬁ  gure 3 reveal that ideological shirking decrea-
ses with the incumbent’s desire to keep more surplus votes (dsI / dε < 0). Every 
additional surplus vote won by the incumbent means one less vote that can be 
converted into shirking (recall the prior discussion on the theorem of minimal 
winning coalitions). The implication of this result is that if there is a close race or 
if the incumbent is rather uncertain about election outcomes, he may prefer to 
create a buffer in terms of surplus votes, which will limit his shirking potential. 
FIGURE 3
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Holding everything else the same, the numerical solutions shown in ﬁ  gure 4 indi-
cate that ideological shirking increases as the challenger’s party platform xPC mo-
ves farther away from the median voter (dsI / dxPC > 0). The intuition here is that 
as the challenger’s party platform becomes more extreme, the challenger becomes 
less capable in proposing a vote-maximizing platform since voters dislike devia-
tions from xPC. As a result, the incumbent can attain more shirking.
FIGURE 4
























In contrast to the previous numerical solutions, the relationship between ideologi-
cal shirking sI and the incumbent’s promised policy platform xPI is more complex, 
Surplus votes (ε)




































































































































474 but far more interesting (see the real part8 of the solution shown in gray in ﬁ  gure 
5). Recall that ideological shirking is equal to xPI – xI
*, where xI
* is the incumbent’s 
optimal policy platform that is a function of all the other parameters in the model, 
including xPI. Assuming the same parameters as before (xPC = 0.6, vI = vC = 0.01, 
kI = kC = 1, and ε = 0.01), the numerical solutions shown in ﬁ  gure 5 reveal that 
ideological shirking is generally rising in xPI but exhibits some non-linearity 
around the median voter. 
FIGURE 5
Shirking and incumbent’s promised platform
Notes: Gray line is the real part of the solution. Black line is the imaginary part of the solution.
Moreover, ideological shirking changes from being negative (xPI  – xI
*
 < 0) to being 
positive (xPI  – xI
*
  > 0) as xPI rises. In the negative shirking range, where xPI  < xI
*
  
and xPI is closer to zero, the incumbent must legislate closer to the median voter to 
get reelected (xI
* is to the right of xPI). In the positive shirking range, where 
xPI  > xI
*
 , the incumbent chooses xI
* to the left of xPI. As xPI begins moving away 
from zero, xI
* runs a bit ahead of xPI until xPI approaches 0.42, where the ﬁ  rst po  licy 
reversal occurs as xI
* changes direction and begins moving towards zero. At this 
point, shirking begins to behave non-linearly (at the beginning of the bulge in ﬁ  -
gure 5) as it decreases fast, initially, in absolute value. As xPI continues to rise, 
shirking continues to decline, but at a decreasing rate, eventually converging to 
zero (sI = xPI – xI
* = 0) around xPI = 0.45 = xI
* as the two variables cross paths on 
the [0, 1] policy space. Soon after xPI surpasses xI
*, the second and last policy re-
versal occurs: xI
* changes direction and begins catching up with xPI. As xI
* growth 
approaches xPI growth, shirking peaks locally, where the bulge’s slope is equal to 
zero, and then declines brieﬂ  y in xPI. Shirking stops declining and begins to rise 
again as the bulge turns into a line at xPI = xPC = 0.6. From there on, shirking rises 
in xPI in the linear fashion. The non-linear shirking range in ﬁ  gure 5 expands pro-
8 Some solutions contain complex numbers, which are converted into real magnitudes using the complex 
conjugate. The magnitude of a complex number is defined as the positive square-root of the complex number 


















































































































































475 portionally in both directions as xPC moves farther away from the median voter. 
Recall that the incumbent’s policy platform xI
* and, by extension, shirking sI are 
limited by xPI and xPC because voters dislike deviations from these platforms. 
The solutions described above are comparable to the solutions obtained with other 
parameter values. Shirking remains non-zero for many other parameter values, 
indicating that the incumbency advantage can be rather strong and shirking persi-
stent. 
5 CONCLUSION
Bender and Lott (1996) offer a thorough review of the empirical literature on le-
gislative shirking, which is yet to reach a consensus. This article contributes to the 
on-going debate by developing a theoretical model that reconciles high incumbent 
reelection rates and ideological shirking within the elegant median voter fra-
mework. The theoretical model developed in this article shows how greater voter 
uncertainty associated with challengers allows incumbents to deviate from the 
promised platform (i.e. shirk) and still be reelected. The presence of ideological 
shirking would indicate that the political market is plagued by the principal-agent 
problem, forcing the public to question whose interests the elected ofﬁ  cials actu-
ally represent. The central conclusion of this article’s model is that the principal-
agent problem is exacerbated when voters perceive incumbents to be less risky 
than challengers. The model predicts that the incumbency advantage and ideolo-
gical shirking can be signiﬁ  cantly diminished if challengers can decrease their 
intrinsic uncertainty. Another possible solution to the incumbency advantage is 
the adoption of legislative term limits, but the author of this article is skeptical of 
their efﬁ  cacy. 
It must also be noted that ideological shirking, depending on its direction, can ei-
ther increase or decrease public sector inefﬁ  ciency if the median voter outcome is 
inefﬁ  cient. Future research should identify the cases when ideological shirking 
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